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Chapter 10. The environment as a site of struggle against settler-colonisation in Palestine  
 





The Zionist settler-colonisation of Palestine is primarily an ecological distribution conflict 
(Martinez Alier, 2002) because it is focused entirely on dispossession of land, water and other 
environmental resources. Israel since 1948 and the military occupation of West Bank and Gaza 
Strip since 1967, as well as precursor Zionist colonisation under British Mandatory and Ottoman 
Empirical rule, have been predicated on dispossession of Palestinian resources. Unlike classical 
colonisation, which exploits indigenous labour for the purpose of capital accumulation in the 
colonising state, settler colonialism has no long-term interest in indigenous labour. On the 
contrary, the settler colonial process actively expels or exterminates indigenous people in the 
process of resource dispossession (Veracini, 2010). Palestinian resistance to settler colonisation 
should therefore be understood as a struggle for environmental justice.  
 
In classical colonialism, value is extracted from the resources and labour of the colonised lands 
for the benefit of a colonising (usually European) country (Verancini, 2010). In such contexts, 
community development has often been used to integrate indigenous peoples into social, 
economic and political structures which serve the interests of the colonial power. By contrast, the 
purpose of settler-colonisation is access to land and resources by a settler population expelled 
from their origins, usually in Europe. The settler-colonist therefore seeks to remove and replace 
the indigenous population and has therefore largely not employed community development 
strategies. Britain, which had used community development strategies extensively elsewhere 
through its Colonial Office, did not do so during its Mandate of Palestine, where the policy 
objective was explicitly to facilitate Zionist settler aspirations rather than Palestinian economic, 
political or labour integration. 
 
Palestinian popular resistance to settler-colonialism has taken a range of forms, from scholarship 
and legal challenge, through non-cooperation and non-violent confrontation to armed struggle 
and the occasional targeting of civilians In the current context of an Israeli settler state, its 
occupation of the West Bank, annexation of East Jerusalem and military blockade of the Gaza 
strip, Palestinian community development has been employed in ways that both resist and 
collude with Zionist settler-colonisation. The distinction between collusion and resistance is a 
central tension, in response to environmental justice struggles against the settler colonisation of 
Palestine. 
 
<1>Environmental justice and settler colonialism 
 
Dispossession of land and resources is at the heart of the settler colonising process. By the 
beginning of the 20th Century, the early Zionist colonisers in Palestine adopted a strategy of 
conquest of land by Jewish labour for their utopian experiments in social organisation and 
agricultural production, and established a range of institutions to facilitate this, including the 
Jewish National Fund (JNF) (1901), to obtain land exclusively for Jewish occupation (Davis and 
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Lehn, 1988) and the Histadrut (1920) for exclusively Jewish labour (Piterberg, 2008). As Simon 
demonstrates in Chapter 8, the JNF has been a means of ethnic cleansing and environmental 
injustice throughout its history, whilst portraying itself as an agent of environmental protection 
(see also Sahibzada, 2010; Davis, 2010; Sawalha et al, 2011; Benjamin et al, 2011). It 
contributed to the Nakba (Khalidi, 1992) and since 1948, as an arm of the Israeli state it has 
enforced apartheid discrimination within the Green Line, and facilitated the ethnic cleansing of 
Palestinian Bedouin in the Naqab / Negev desert. The Histadrut meanwhile has continued to 
pursue exclusionary and discriminatory labour practices whilst presenting internationally as a 
trade union. 
Within the 1967 military occupation areas, Israeli policies in the West Bank pursue settler-
colonial objectives, preventing farmers from reaching their land, justifying and legitimising 
barriers, evictions and confiscations. Access is blocked in the name of military orders, through 
selective confiscations, denial of permits, through classifying land as having natural or strategic 
value or through straightforward violent intimidation. Agricultural land is contaminated with raw 
sewage from settlements or the leachate of unregulated waste dumps. Untended land is regarded 
as abandoned and confiscated by the occupying State. Lack of regulation leads to pollution from 
Palestinian waste recycling (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2012), construction (Gharib, 
2013) and industrial development. Thus, through a range of mechanisms, Israel is progressively 
dispossessing Palestinians of their resources (al-Butmeh et al, 2013). 
In Gaza, where 70% of the population are refugees, the occupation takes the form of a blockade 
and periodic military attack with resultant environmental injustice. Exit from, and entry to the 
Gaza strip is tightly controlled by the Israeli military. Access to fresh water is close to zero 
(UNCTAD, 2015). The southern end of the coastal aquifer on which Gaza depends is depleted to 
the extent that it is saline with backfill from the sea and the over-pumped Israeli side, and close 
to collapse. Refill of the aquifer has been blocked by the damming and abstraction of water from 
Wadi Gaza in Israel (Koppelman and Alshalalfeh, 2012; al-Shalalfeh et al, 2018). Most of the 
agricultural land is located around the periphery of the strip and farmers are regularly targeted by 
Israeli snipers (Safi, 2015). Israel imposes severe restrictions on the entry of agricultural 
materials, from fertilisers to wells. Internal movement to the West Bank and export of 
agricultural produce is significantly limited by time, quantity and arbitrary checks. Fishing, once 
a major industry in Gaza, is likewise decimated as Israel’s imposed coastal exclusion zone – and 
regular attacks on boats within it – restricts fishing, unsustainably, to young and reproducing fish 
that inhabit the (contaminated) area closest to the shore.  
In the summer of 2014, Israeli bombardments from the air, land and sea resulted in over 2,000 
dead, mostly civilian and around half, children. Safi (2015) reports considerable additional 
damage to an already denuded environment, in terms of food security, air quality, damage to 
water infrastructure, soil degradation, chemical contamination, coastal pollution and ecological 
destruction. Environmental health problems are considerable and expected to increase as a result 
of Israeli attacks, including the use of toxic chemicals in munitions (see also BMJ, 2009; Naim et 
al, 2012; Garrity, 2015).  




The historical origins of community development in British colonial administration have been 
well documented. Mayo (1975), for example, describes the contradictory function of community 
development in British colonies, where it was promoted as a means to integrate colonised 
populations into a modern capitalist economy, democratic polity and labour discipline orientated 
around the interests of the colonial power in particular, and the western states in general. Based 
on an ideology of ‘civilising’ native populations, community development in British colonies 
was intended to improve living standards of indigenous people – preferably at their own 
instigation but failing which, with their participation (voluntary or otherwise) – whilst at the 
same time exploiting their labour and dispossessing their resources. Colonial community 
development policies were also designed to undermine threats from nationalist movements for 
independence, and later to shape movements for self-determination towards British interests 
post-independence, in particular to ensure that they were ‘safe’ from communism. Despite these 
manipulative intentions, community development programmes served to mobilise solidarity and 
collective action and in some colonial contexts made considerable contributions to anti-colonial 
struggles (Mayo, 2008).  
The colonial occupation of Palestine was unusual in several respects. Successively colonised by 
British and Zionist occupiers since the Ottoman Empire, it is Zionist settler-colonisation which 
has shaped social relations since the nineteenth century. The British Mandate of Palestine 
between 1920 and 1948, whilst falling under the remit of the Colonial Office, was orientated 
towards Zionist, not British colonisation whilst protecting British interests. Mandates were 
established under the League of Nations and, although colonial, they were ostensibly designed to 
facilitate ultimate self-determination for the indigenous population. However, the Palestine 
Mandate embedded the policy of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which committed the British 
government to ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’. Thus, 
rather than facilitating Palestinian self-determination, policies were generally orientated towards 
facilitating settler colonisation by Zionist Jews, mostly from Europe (Kattan, 2009). The 
pressures on the Colonial Office and Mandate administration in Palestine were therefore 
somewhat different from other colonial contexts. Policies towards Palestinian Arabs were 
focussed on repressing resistance to Zionist dispossession and there was little appetite for 
developing a Palestinian economy or encouraging Arab participation (Seikaly, 2015). European 
Jewish settlers imported their own models of community development such as the kibbutzim and 
Labour Zionism, which were orientated towards the objectives of Jewish nationalism, utopian 
socialism, land appropriation, constructing a settlement economy, and displacement of Arab 
labour. Although not operating along what would be regarded as community development 
principles, Palestinian welfare was somewhat dependent on the waqf (Muslim religious 
endowment) institutions well after this system had been abandoned in many other Islamic 
societies. 
There was, however a lively popular resistance movement against Zionist colonisation and 
British collusion, which grew in the 1920s and in particular following the 1929 riots and 
subsequent repression and the 1936 general strike and Arab revolt which was ultimately crushed 
in 1939 (Qumsiyeh, 2011; Cronin, 2017). As Qumsiyeh has shown, popular resistance has been a 
continuous part of Palestinian society throughout the Zionist occupation, at times mobilising 
grassroots community development and at others involving more centralised structures on the 
basis of political expediency and possibility. This has periodically emerged into more active 
confrontation, such as the 1936-39 Arab revolt, and the intifadas of 1987-93 and 2000-02. 
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During the first intifada, considerable numbers of Palestinians found themselves political 
prisoners in Israeli gaols and this led to a structure of self-organised popular education in the 
prisons (Rosenfeld, 2011) which had a combined impact of strengthening the political 
organisation of the movement but ingraining a hierarchical structure somewhat divorced from 
community struggles. Some prisoners were released as part of the Oslo accords, and elements of 
this structure transferred to the wider struggle, which potentially enabled a more focussed, top-
down organisation required for the armed uprising of the second intifada. After this was defeated 
in 2002, and the construction of the separation wall increased the confiscation of land, resistance 
became more grassroots and community led (Zwahre and Scandrett, 2014), mobilising the 
popular struggle committees. 
In Palestine today, there is another resurgence in popular resistance, employing principles of 
community development and nonviolent confrontation as evidenced across the West Bank (the 
Bab al-Shams camp against the E1 extension of Jerusalem in 2013), Israel (Day of Rage against 
the Prawer Plan in 2013 (H, 2013)) and Gaza (March of Return in 2018 (Baroud, 2018)).  
<1>Community development as popular struggle 
 
In Palestine, community development cannot be separated from popular resistance to the 
occupation which has been occurring since the early Zionist colonisation. As Qumsiyeh (2011) 
defines it, popular resistance involves six components: 
 
Popular resistance in Palestine is a movement of direct action intended to accomplish what 
other similar movements have done before: 
 pressuring opponents to understand the injustice that they engage in. 
 weakening the grip of opponents on power. 
 strengthening the community, including forms of empowerment and steadfastness (sumud 
in Arabic). 
 bolstering the ability to withstand injustice and do something about it. 
 building self-sufficiency and improving standards of living. 
 achieving justice, including the right to return and self-determination. (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 
30) 
 
Just as community development under conditions of European colonisation was employed for the 
purposes of the colonisers and the colonised, so under Zionist settler colonisation, Palestinian 
community development can become part of the popular resistance or for normalising the 
occupation  
<2>Al Ma’sara community centre 
 
Al Ma’sara is a village in the Bethlehem Governorate with a population of under 1,000, with the 
main industry being agriculture (Applied Research Center Jerusalem, 2014). Land therefore 
constitutes a major source of employment nearly all of which is in Area C and therefore under 
control of the Israeli authorities. The village is surrounded by settlements which are continually 
encroaching on land, and access to land is constrained by direct confiscation or indirectly 
through constant intimidation by settlers, their security guards, and the Israeli military.  
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Use of A’-Shmoh Community Centre has changed over the last 20 years. In 2000-2002, during 
the second intifada, when the Israeli army shut down most of the West Bank, schools were 
closed and movement was even more restricted than usual. In these extreme circumstances, the 
community centre became a temporary school for the children where they were taught by 
community volunteers. 
When the intensity of violence subsided, schools reopened and the community centre focussed 
on language lessons for the local community: English, French, Italian, Spanish, Hebrew: useful 
for the increasing numbers of European, North American and Israeli solidarity activists who 
were coming to the West Bank. In the following years, land dispossession escalated: illegal 
settlement and infrastructure was constructed and the apartheid wall was erected. The A'-Shmoh 
community centre became a base for planning and training of nonviolent resistance by villagers 
and international activists and a de facto headquarters of the Al Ma’sara Popular Struggle 
Coordinating Committee (Zwahre and Scandrett, 2014). In coordination with popular struggle 
committees in other villages, resistance took many forms: marches towards stolen land; blocking 
settlement roads; erecting ‘counter’ settlements; non-cooperation with the occupying authorities, 
varieties of unarmed and nonviolent confrontation with the Israeli military with a view to forcing 
a crisis in the occupation and make it ungovernable. 
As settler and soldier violence increased and such direct confrontations became more dangerous, 
tactics changed and the popular resistance / community development diversified further: a 
kindergarten, financially supported by international supporters who are provided with 
information when family members are arrested; a women’s cooperative producing traditional 
embroidery for international fair trade; alternative tourism for building international solidarity; 
community media training, arts projects, education in human rights all take place in the context 
of anti-colonial resistance. Resource dispossession is being challenged through everyday 
Palestinian organic resistance. Living on and cultivating land right up to barriers with the illegal 
settlements, sometimes with international volunteers, helps to prevent confiscation. Farmers’ 
cooperatives share the cultivation of land of those farmers denied permits or imprisoned. Rights 
of access are insisted, by group actions where necessary, and nonviolent non-cooperation 
practiced with settlers and military.  
<2>Youth and community in Aida refugee camp  
 
The Aida Youth Center is among the few community centres in the Aida Camp in Bethlehem, of 
5,500 inhabitants, all refugees from the 1948 Nakba and their descendants (UNRWA, 2015). The 
camp is now dominated by a 20-foot high reinforced concrete wall punctuated by watch towers 
from which heavily armed Israeli soldiers monitor every activity. Although largely in Area A 
(and therefore ‘security’ is devolved to forces of the Palestinian Authority) incursions by Israeli 
soldiers into the camp are a regular occurrence, arbitrary arrests frequent, including of children 
who are routinely held in administrative detention, without charge, trial, evidence or justification. 
Community centres such as the Aida Youth Center and nearby Lajee Center are regularly raided 
or fired at by soldiers. Peaceful protests are met with tear gas, rubber-coated bullets and, not 
infrequently, live ammunition (UNRWA, 2015). There have been instances of death threats 
announced by megaphone from armoured vehicles and of blackmail applied to Palestinian 
Authority police to repress their own children. In October 2015, an unarmed child was 
assassinated by an Israeli sniper (Levy, 2015).  
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Young people are presented with a narrow range of options between suicidal violence and 
traumatic collapse, but still regularly achieve imaginative yet fragile alternatives in the form of 
nonviolent resistance. Community workers aim to facilitate this, and often demonstrate 
considerable creativity in combining arts, anger and defiance.  
One project built a model ‘train of return’ for the purposes of carrying refugees back to the 
location of their family property, now in Israel or on annexed land. The right of return of 
refugees is a legal entitlement according to international law, mandated by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 194, yet persistently denied by Israel. The train was of course met with a 
violent response by Israeli soldiers. For the refugees of Aida, constructing and symbolically 
riding the train in the direction of the lands to which they are entitled (although many will never 
have seen) as far as the steel gates in the Israeli wall, was a creative way to keep hope alive 
whilst confronting the Israeli forces with their rights. Such creativity in resistance – and 
community workers who promote it – is increasingly shunned by some international funders 
under pressure from Israel, either directly or via their own government, who prefer to fund 
projects which acquiesce in the occupation. 
<2>Food insecurity in Gaza 
 
Food insecurity is an acute problem in the besieged and congested Gaza strip, with a population 
of two million in a narrow strip of land 25 miles long (PCBS, 2017). Following the 2014 attack, 
the percentage of households requiring food assistance increased from 66% to 72% (Safi, 2015). 
The Union of Agricultural Works Committees (UAWC) operates at a level of grassroots 
organisation which seeks to challenge food insecurity through economic empowerment and 
technical support for farmers, and supporting cooperative work for improving quality and 
sharing of experiences. This work combines with political mobilisation in support of food 
sovereignty, which requires an end to occupation.  
Community workers help establish local committees of farmers and fisherfolk who organise 
collective responses to common concerns, most of which is dominated by the Israeli siege. The 
activities of UAWC include the repair and maintenance of wells and irrigation technology, 
largely dependent on the reuse and recycling of materials within Gaza: metals from bombed 
buildings are separated from rubble and smelted and re-cast in order to produce components for 
pumps. Where products can be imported, UAWC works with the committees to prioritise 
purchases of items of high capital value, such as boats, to optimise benefit for the community.  
Export to Europe for high value crops such as strawberries is an opportunity for income even 
though export licences controlled by Israel are unreliable. UAWC negotiates for international 
funds to invest in agricultural development for the committees for crop production, such as poly-
tunnels and hydrological management systems to maximise crop production with limited access 
to water. Moreover, UAWC insists that food security is only possible with food sovereignty: for 
Palestinians to have control of their own resources. International funds which come with strings 
as concessions to the occupation are rejected as counter-productive.  
The agricultural works committees with which UAWC collaborates become local sites of 
community mobilisation against the blockade which are independent of funding, NGOs and 
political parties, determining their own priorities, embedding inclusionary practices and linking 
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social and economic development in the harshest of circumstances to political mobilisation 
challenging the blockade. In 2018, community organisations across the Gaza Strip mounted a 
sustained ‘March of Return’ between ‘Land Day’ 30 March and ‘Nakba Day’ 15 May, 
demanding their rights as refugees to return to the lands from which their families were evicted 
in 1948, and an end to the blockade imposed since 2007. Their unarmed protests were met with 
Israeli sniper fire, with 111 Palestinians killed and over 12,000 injured (Chughtai, 2018). 
<2>Women’s resistance 
 
In the Palestinian community, where women are still fighting for equal civil rights, the 
occupation policies and practices have different implications for women and men. The 
combination of the occupation policies and the conservatism of a large part of the Palestinian 
community hinders the status of women’s rights. Also, it leads to a reproduction of violence 
against girls and women (see for example Clark et al, 2010; Haj-Yahia and Clark, 2013) which 
increases the exposure of women to risks from the occupation. Because women are believed to 
be less targeted, their involvement in family affairs, which may involve movement inside the 
community, increases during tense political situations. Many women report taking over tasks 
from men such as buying bread and cultivating land, risking exposure to Israeli violence as well 
as harassment from Palestinian men. (al-Shalalfeh, unpublished data) One activist woman 
explained that she was able to challenge the occupying soldiers by cultivating her land when her 
husband was in jail to prevent it being confiscated (Zwahre, unpublished data). 
Tense political situations, not only give women more domestic tasks but also increase their 
political participation in acts of resistance. Some inside the Palestinian women’s rights 
movement see that such situations give a woman a leadership role which she does not take in a 
normal situation, but she might be able to maintain at least partially. However, exposing women 
to more risk is just an extension to their traditional role where they are expected to sacrifice for 
the greater interest of their families (al-Shalalfeh, unpublished data). The community is much 
less welcoming of women’s representation in leadership roles, compared to delegating to them 
responsibilities that expose them to risks but do not increase their decision-making authority. In 
any case, the belief that women are less targeted than men is unfounded: sexual violence against 
Palestinian women has been explicitly advocated by Israeli police and Israeli political leaders 
(Aljazeera, 2017).  
Women have been involved in the struggle for political and social independence since the 19th 
century, through charities at first and later politically. In 1893, women organized their first 
demonstration against the establishment of the first Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1929, ten 
women were killed in the battle of Al Buraq. In 1929 women held their first national conference 
which was followed by the formation of three women’s unions. During the period from 1948 and 
1967, women had active involvement in charitable work, which helped relieving the bereaved 
families as well as equipping women professionally. In 1965, the General Union of the 
Palestinian Women was established as a popular feminist organisation.. The establishment of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) later in 1964 politicised the agenda of the women’s 
movement as their role become representing the Palestinian political parties, providing social 
services and mobilizing women for political action. This shift in the women movement’s agenda 
was not reflected in their representation constituting only 7.5% of the members in 1996. The 
work of the feminist movement was marked by the absence of a unified strategy until 1990 when 
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the movement held a national conference in Jerusalem and drew a plan for the future. This 
conference coincided with the start of the peace negotiations. However, hopes for increased 
women’s participation faded with the construction of the Palestinian National Authority. 
Women’s organisations tried to gain independence from the political parties. In 1996 legislative 
elections, 49% of the voters but only 3.7% of the candidates were women. Five women won 
which was a victory for the women’s movement, although the governments from 1997 to 2007 
had only one or two women ministers. In the popular resistance, women have linked colonialism 
with sexism, both based on the underestimation of women’s power.  
 
<1>Community development as normalisation 
 
Attempts at community development which do not embed resistance to the occupation, collude 
with it. Any attempts to build community capacity, organise events, develop projects, identify 
collective learning needs, construct or renovate buildings or social enterprise activity inevitably 
encounter the Israeli military occupation. Community workers are faced with the choice of 
accommodating the occupation or confronting it. This causes particular dilemmas where funding 
is required. Almost all sources of funding for community development in Palestine are foreign, 
and many such international sources are reluctant to fund resistance to the occupation. In this 
context, funded community work can reify dehistoricised settler-colonial power relations and 
therefore promote Israeli objectives and development funding thus becomes ‘political money’ 
serving Israeli interests. 
 
International organizations—and many local Palestinian NGOs— project a view of 
development divorced from the power relations at play under Israeli settler colonialism… 
As a result, the dominant development framework obfuscates, and thereby strengthens, the 
reality of Israeli settler colonialism in the oPt [occupied Palestinian territories]. (Hanieh, 
2016: 33) 
There are a number of community development initiatives in both Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory which serves to normalise the occupation and ensure that development is 
only addressed within terms set by Israel and the Zionist settler-colonial project – as well as a 
Zionist environmental movement eager to collaborate with Palestinians, strictly on Israel’s terms 
(Tal, 2002). For example the Israeli government has funded settlers of illegal Efrata colony in the 
West Bank to build ecological farms and agricultural schools on private Palestinian land from 
which Palestinians are excluded, and calling on international volunteers to work for this 
‘environmental’ project.  
In response to support in Britain for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, the Board 
of Deputies of British Jews (a body which claims to represent British Jewish interests but 
actually promotes pro-Zionist propaganda and attacks Palestinian solidarity in Britain) published 
A better way than boycotts (Moses, 2015), which lists initiatives which advocate 'peace' without 
decolonisation. Under the heading of ‘Supporting Peace by Bringing People Together’, many of 
these appear to reflect community development values and practices to address collective 
problems whilst refusing to question the roots of the problem in the political context of settler-
colonisation. The sub-text is that a solution to the ‘conflict’ can be achieved by Jews and 
Palestinians living peacefully together as coloniser and colonised, in which ‘Israelis campaign 
112 
 
for concessions to their government, and Palestinians doing the same with theirs’ (Moses, 2015: 
40). But Palestinians citizens of Israel are denied ‘nationality rights’, which limits on 
discriminatory grounds what concessions can legitimately be campaigned for. In the West Bank, 
Israelis in illegal settlements have full Israeli rights, access to the Israeli government, whereas 
Palestinians are subject to Israeli military governance. The complex of passes, permits and 
access rights across the occupied territories is part of the Matrix of Control imposed by Israel on 
Palestinians (Harper, 2000). Any concessions which question the settler-colonial foundation of 
the state is prohibited even in the Left’s political ideology (Haaretz, 2017). At the time of 
writing, a precedent was established when the Israeli army evicted Palestinian communities 
based on the Military Order No. 757 which is meant to enable the evacuation of unauthorized 
settlement outposts: Israel has dealt with native Palestinian residents as illegal residents and has 
considered area C its own land (Hass, 2017).  
One of these normalisation projects addresses environmental concerns in the region. EcoPeace 
Middle East (formerly Middle East Friends of the Earth) is an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian NGO 
which focuses on addressing environmental problems by bringing together activists of different 
ethnicities and nationalities, including through community development initiatives. The Board of 
Deputies describes their work as: 
EcoPeace/MEFoE brings Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian environmentalists to cooperate 
on environmental issues and to support sustainable development. Examples of successes 
include Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian mayors agreeing to rehabilitate the Jordan River. 
The environment is a necessary area for mutual dependency, and this inter-dependence is 
highly significant. Since 1994, Jordan stores its water in Israel’s Sea of Galilee in the 
winter, with Israel giving the water back to Jordan in the summer. ECOPeace Israel’s 
Director, Gidon Bromberg, pointed to this project noting ‘prior enemies can create positive 
interdependencies once they start trusting each other’. (Moses, 2015: 43) 
EcoPeace’s Jordan River project is an example of how normalisation operates to legitimise 
Israel’s occupation. The Jordan River flows from the Syrian-Lebanese mountains, through the 
Sea of Galilee within the Israeli Green Line, to the Dead Sea along the border of the occupied 
West Bank and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon. Access to this water has been a source of 
conflict between Israel and the riparian Arab countries and populations of the region. There have 
been a number of internationally brokered attempts to provide an equitable sharing of access to 
this water between riparian countries on the basis of international law and conventions on 
transboundary water courses. These have all been blocked by Israel who instead constructed the 
National Water Carrier, a system of canals and pipelines which has diverted the Jordan water 
from the Sea of Galilee to central and southern Israel, forming a major source of water for 
domestic and agricultural use. The water flow in the Jordan River has since declined by more 
than 96%, with an accompanying ecological and social disaster (Isaac and Hilal, 2011).  
EcoPeace’s Jordan River Valley rehabilitation project involves a range of sustainable 
development and community development initiatives to manage and regenerate the valley, 
including increasing the water being released from the Sea of Galilee. This has only been 
possible by collaborating with Israel which has total control of the water, either directly or via 
the ‘hydro-hegemony’ through which Israel controls the Palestine Water Authority (Zeitoun, 
2012). Access to the River Jordan is entirely determined by Israel and denied to Palestinians by 
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military order. The EcoPeace approach to ‘rehabilitation’ of the Jordan Valley is dependent on, 
and therefore perpetuates, Israeli control through illegal annexation and military occupation (al-
Shalalfeh, Napier and Scandrett, 2018). As a result of this and other normalisation projects, 
EcoPeace was expelled from the Friends of the Earth International confederation. 
<1>Community development and international solidarity 
 
Many authors have emphasised the centrality of solidarity to community development. For 
Bhattacharyya (2004), solidarity is the essence of community whereas McCrea, Meade and Shaw 
(2017) argue that a practice of solidarity can be forged through the dialogue between community 
development practitioners and social movement activists. The struggle against settler 
colonisation in Palestine has built international solidarity into its strategy, especially since 2005 
with the Palestinian call for a campaign of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel. The 
campaign focuses on three demands which represent the direct interests of three sectors of the 
Palestinian population: an end to the occupation of Arab lands (the populations of Gaza strip and 
West Bank, including East Jerusalem (as well as the Syrian Golan Heights)); an end to 
discriminatory laws within Israel (Palestinian citizens of Israel) and the right of return of 
refugees (the refugee diaspora). This call has mobilised actions to promote boycotts of consumer 
products from Israel, cultural events sponsored by Israel, formal academic ties to Israeli 
universities, challenges to institutional links with Israel of trades unions, campaigns targeting 
companies that invest in or trade with Israel (especially arms manufacturers), lobbying local 
authorities, churches, pension funds and so on to divest from Israeli companies. Such 
international solidarity efforts have facilitated considerable opportunities for community 
mobilisation and politicisation throughout the world, including in the global environmental 
justice movement. 
The Jewish National Fund has been subject to international mobilisations, in particular by Jewish 
groups opposed to Zionism. Fundraising efforts have been disrupted and legal and public 
campaigns have challenged the charitable and tax exempt status of JNF branches throughout the 
world. Environmental organisations have joined with other civil society organisations publicly to 
distance themselves from the JNF’s claim to be anything other than an agent of ethnic cleansing 
and colonisation. 
Friends of the Earth Palestine, the Palestinian BDS National Committee and the Land Defence 
Coalition have coordinated a campaign to stop international cooperation agreements with 
Mekorot, Israel’s state-owned water company responsible for implementing ‘water apartheid’: 
the pillage of natural resources in occupied territory, discrimination against the Palestinian 
people and vital support for the illegal settlement enterprise. Mekorot is a Trans National 
Corporation that commits the major part of its human rights violations in the location where it is 
based and uses international contracts to finance this. The Israeli water sector was developed to 
steal Palestinian water for Israeli colonisation. Mekorot has been responsible for water rights 
violations and discrimination since the 1950s when it built Israel’s national water carrier. At the 
same time it deprives the Palestinian communities of the possibility of access to water. 
For environmental groups, the normalisation activities of EcoPeace have drawn attention to the 
nature of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. News of the exclusion of EcoPeace from Friends of 





Settler-colonisation, Wolfe insisted, is a process and not an event. The same is true of 
community development (Craig et al, 2011). These processes interact in Palestine, although the 
primary driver is settler-colonisation and resistance to it, both of which can employ the 
techniques of community development. Discerning the distinction is crucial for those engaged in 
community development in Palestine, and for the international community acting in solidarity. 
Community development which is based on Bhattacharyya’s (2004) twin purpose of the 
promotion of solidarity and agency, cannot be separated from resistance to the occupation, or 
from environmental justice, with access to land, to water, to resources. The Zionist project of 
settler colonialism since its origins, concerns basic dispossession of resources and removal of the 
Palestinian population. In that sense settler-colonialism is an ecological resource conflict and 
Palestinian resistance, whether at community level, wider movements or international solidarity, 
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